There is an aspect of the Turkish defense industries that many do not talk about, even though it is considered one of the most important keys to understanding the boom that has occurred in this sector over the last fifteen years.
If we wanted to approach it from an academic perspective, the subject relates to the changing civil-military relations in Turkey and the impact of this transformation on the management of defense industries.
To simplify the idea, it lies in the fact that when management moved away from the traditional military model and entered into a civil-technocratic framework, the face of the entire industry changed.
The idea is not that military personnel are incompetent or that civilians are smarter, but it is not possible to manage an advanced technological industry, with high risks, and directed towards global markets with the mentality of a hierarchical military institution whose primary goal is to meet the needs of the internal army only.
To understand this shift, we must go back a little in time.
Major companies in the Turkish defense industry like "Aselsan" and "TAY" were founded in the 1970s, within a purely political context, after the shock of the American arms embargo following the Cyprus crisis in 1974, which accompanied a Turkish awareness that complete dependence on the West poses a strategic risk.
Aselsan was established in 1975 as a direct response to that embargo, and it has been affiliated since its inception with the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation.
The TAY company was established a little earlier, but it acquired its larger industrial form in the 1980s when it entered into partnerships with American companies to produce and assemble F-16 aircraft.
This means that both companies were part of a project to localize defense industries, but it remained closely linked to the military institution and meeting the immediate needs of the armed forces.
These companies were subject to the influence of military-controlled institutions, in addition to a large number of retired military personnel serving on their boards of directors and in senior positions.
This naturally reflected on the culture of management itself, which became conservative, risk-averse, with a near-total focus on meeting the requirements of the Turkish army, and broad reliance on licensed production or limited development.
This is not a personal opinion, but a well-known logic in management and innovation studies, where these studies indicate that governance style and decision-making processes directly affect the level of innovation, risk-taking willingness, and the ability to think about long-term commercial viability.
When a defense company is managed with the mentality of a closed sovereign institution, it is natural that it produces for the internal market, but it is difficult to become a global player in exporting, innovation, and negotiation.
Therefore, although the Turkish defense industrial structure has existed for about fifty years, the growth of this sector remained limited for a long time.
Until the beginning of 2010, the exports of Turkish defense and aerospace industries did not exceed a billion dollars, and it was advancing very slowly compared to the aspirations of the state at that time.
The real transformation did not happen suddenly, but it began to accelerate significantly around 2004.
The state became a strategic buyer not the only one from this sector, increased spending on research and development, and opened the door for private and semi-private companies to enter a field that was previously nearly closed.
However, the failed coup attempt in 2016 was a pivotal moment in accelerating this path, as it allowed for a radical rearrangement of power balances within the state, including the defense industries sector.
After 2016, a pivotal step was taken by directly linking the Defense Industries Agency (SSB) to the presidency.
This decision achieved three things at once:
Repositioning decision-making away from traditional military institution networks, accelerating changes in leadership within the companies and the agency itself, and creating a degree of harmony between the defense industry, foreign policy, and the geopolitical goals of the state.
This opened the door to a new generation of civil-technocratic leaderships, with backgrounds in management, economics, engineering, and aviation.
An obvious example of this transformation is "Tamal Kotel," coming from the management of Turkish Airlines, which is a global civil company that dealt with competition, marketing, efficiency, and profitability, achieving great success in these areas.
When Kotel took over the leadership of TAY after 2016, his thinking was not confined to the question: "What does the army need today?" but expanded to include "What will it need tomorrow?" and "What can the global market buy?".
This transformation shifted the industry from the logic of a "closed sovereign program" to the logic of a "strategic defense product suitable for export".
From here, a new discourse began to emerge in Turkey, even an official slogan saying:: "Defense as an Export Industry" (ihracat için savunma sanayii).
During the same period, annual spending on research and development in the defense sector reached about three billion dollars.
The companies became more flexible, with increased attention to efficiency, profitability, and time, and a clearer relationship appeared with the global market.
All of this reflected in the figures, as Turkish defense and aerospace exports rose from less than a billion dollars to about 7.2 billion dollars in 2024.
But more important than the figures is the quality of the products: The fighter "Kaan," the naval missile "Atmaca," and the armed drones that have changed the balance of power in more than one theater.
These products are not just technological successes, but a direct result of changing management philosophy and the state’s relationship with the industry.
Many analyses classify Turkey today as an emerging country in the field of defense industries, attributing this transformation to four main factors that have integrated with each other:.
·Marginalizing the direct political role of the military institution.
·The rise of a central civil leadership controlling strategic decision-making (the presidency + the defense industries agency).
·Utilizing the defense sector as a tool of hard and soft power in foreign policy.
·Encouraging private and semi-private companies to enter the market instead of limiting it to entities linked to the military institution only.
This is a very important lesson for many countries aspiring to reach the level achieved by Turkey; the issue is not just about technical capabilities, as Turkish engineers have been around since 1974, but the management style itself is what has brought about this leap, when the state left the "bread to its owner", meaning management to the specialized minds.
This is an AI-generated English translation. The original text is in العربية
PhD Researcher in Defense Contracting and Cooperation Policies
