I am writing this article now as I listen to the song "Keep the Weapon Alert." I noticed it repeats the phrase "alert" three times.
When I studied a concept called the economics of readiness, I understood the importance of the phrase "the weapon is alert." This is not an exaggeration; yes, I say it as a hook to continue reading, but I promise you will understand why I say that now.
Let us start and discover some exciting facts that might completely change your perspective on armament and the balance of numerical strength of defense systems in countries.
If I were to ask you about the most important weapon in the world right now, the answer would be: the F-35. You would say: Yes, you are sharp, and your studying is good. But did you know that at the same time it is one of the least prepared weapons in the world? This is due to a very high cost for the countries that own this system, costing millions of dollars annually.
I will give you an example to illustrate what I mean, but I stipulate that you complete reading the article after understanding this example and not leave it before reaching more important information…
Imagine you bought a "Ferrari," but it is parked in your garage, and you can't drive it because there is one filter that is only sold by "Ferrari". You go down to the car workshops area to ask about it, and everyone tells you: "No way engineer, this filter is not available in the market." You request it from the company itself, and they reply: "Sure," and then leave you waiting for months, even if you have an important trip and need the car for it.
After a long wait, the filter finally arrives, and the company tells you: "Wait, an engineer from Ferrari must come personally to install it," and while this happens, you have paid for the filter itself, the engineer's fee, and you've waited a lot.
This is exactly how the real defense economy looks like right now.
And why is this topic important?
Because it changes our idea of measuring strength by the number of aircraft, tanks, or missiles owned by a state, and adds another more important dimension, which is the level of readiness. It makes us think about operation before thinking about purchase.
For example, the F-35 project is considered the most expensive military project in human history. Its total cost has exceeded two trillion dollars. No, wait a moment! Stop here for a bit, because this number is almost equivalent to Egypt's economy four times! Can you imagine that? Answer me, do you truly grasp the size of this number?
Okay, excellent. Now let’s look at the details of this number.
Of it, 422 billion dollars were allocated for purchase and development, while the remaining 1.58 trillion dollars are for operating and maintaining the project.
In defense economics, there is a famous pricing model called the Razor and Blade Model. And why is it called that? Because the idea stems from the name itself: the company sells you the razor at a low price, then forces you later to buy the blades and the special oil from the same company at a high price.
And in the defense field, the logic is almost the same. The original system is sold at a competitive price, but the spare parts are produced by the company itself and are high-priced. Technical data is owned by the company, maintenance work must happen through it, and training is done at accredited institutes that they follow. Thus the cycle continues.
This means you are forced to establish a long-term relationship with the company or state from which you purchased the weapon. The lifespan of this relationship equals the shelf life of the weapon you acquired, and that company or state holds your hand that hurts you throughout this period… literally.
What’s worse is that this dependence on the company does not have to be used against you explicitly; it can be through indirect methods, like saying to you: "The stock is depleted," or "We are waiting for a specific component for the spare part," or imposing restrictions on export and import, either directly on you or on the company you are dealing with.
And this is not theoretical by the way. In December 2025, just a few weeks ago, the Office of the Inspector General at the Pentagon mentioned in its report that the readiness of the F-35 fighters does not exceed 50%. While the minimum required is 67%. This means there is a hangar full of fighters, but only half of them can actually be used.
No, wait a moment… The 50% figure isn't even full readiness. If we talk about actual full readiness, the number drops to only 30%. That is, if you have ten aircraft, you will only be able to operate three of them at full capability.
Here’s a surprise, or let’s say shock: Did you know that the readiness level for the same aircraft in Israel is 85%?
At the time when the American Air Force struggled to raise the readiness of the F-35A fighters to 51.5%, Israel was operating its fleet of 39 F-35I fighters with a readiness indicator of 85% of operational capability (Mission Capability Index).
In the first phase of the October 2023 war, only five aircraft out of 39 were inoperable, but Israel repaired four of them immediately before the first day of the war actually began.
Moreover, Israel operates these aircraft with a monthly flight hour rate that exceeds 565% of the American average, without a significant decrease in readiness.
The real question is: How did they do that?
I will speak based on the sources I read, but for another perspective on the topic, I think you will understand it without me stating it explicitly…
The answer simply lies in controlling the global supply chain for spare parts and technical data.
Israel has strategic relationships that allow it to obtain spare parts from US allies in just a few days. Wait a moment... Did you grasp that well? Spare parts for an American aircraft are delayed for the American Air Force itself, but they are not delayed for Israel.
On top of that, Israel has developed its own version of the F-35 with local modifications, including an extra fuel tank, local electronic warfare systems, and advanced weapons of its own production.
And if you think this is a case specific to the United States and the F-35 fighters only, let’s move on to Germany.
The report of the German Parliament's Commissioner for the Armed Forces in 2024 indicated a continuous shortage of main equipment, spare parts, and ammunition. The shortage reached a level that forced Germany, a major industrial nation, to dismantle some weapons to use their spare parts to repair and operate other military equipment — like some MARDER vehicles that were dismantled to restart other systems.
Also take this point: The readiness of the German armed forces today is only 50%. Do you know how much it was before the Ukraine war? It was 65%. So it is declining instead of improving, and projections indicate it may drop to 20% by 2027. As for short-range air defense systems, they are expected to be ready by 2029 — and good luck with that afterward.
Please focus with me here... Germany has been spending on defense at record rates in recent years, and yet readiness is declining? Yes, that’s true. Because the real problem lies in global supply chains and in local maintenance and operational capabilities. That's why I told you at the beginning that this dimension is extremely important when studying defense capabilities.
And if you’ve made it to this point in the article, then you are truly my friend, and you deserve to know how this dilemma is solved.
The solution is something many do not like to talk about because it undermines the media glow that accompanies every new armament deal. But take it from me, no one will tell you this so straightforwardly:
A deal that does not include control over maintenance and data is an incomplete deal.
Because if you contemplate all that has been said, you will discover that the real transformation does not start with the question "What will I buy?" This is the easy question, but rather starts with the question "How will I operate it? At what cost? Who has the control?"
You need to realize that technical data is not just papers added to the end of the file. Catalogs, testing tools, maintenance center capabilities, and your rights for local modifications — these are not side appendices, but they are the foundation.
They determine whether you really own the weapon or if you are just a tenant at the company.
Okay, even if you get the technical data, will you be able to fix everything from day one?
Of course not.
The idea is not to turn into a manufacturer from the first year but to gradually build local maintenance and operational capability. You start with the less sensitive parts — those that break down often and stop the entire system because of a small piece — then you step up to more complex components... until you finally own a real margin of independence.
And here comes the point that pains those who only care about appearances: readiness requires money, and its budget must be completely separate from the purchase budget.
The easiest thing in the world is to reduce the maintenance budget to finance a new deal and present a charming image to the public.
But that is not "saving"... It's sabotage of the entire defensive capabilities.
Readiness must have a separate operational and maintenance budget, just like the salary or electricity line in companies.
It cannot be cut under the pretext of buying a new coffee machine, because simply, in doing so, you replace real capability with false decoration.
The last solution — or rather the last strategic awareness — is to realize that stockpiling spare parts is not a luxury, but a doctrine.
A state that introduces new weapon systems without considering a stockpile of spare parts for the coming years is buying a postponed problem, not a simple problem.
A problem that emerges in a crisis day, when you discover that a small piece the size of your palm — but its absence — has turned your systems into junk.
Or perhaps the piece is available, but in a faraway place, or subject to export restrictions, or you are simply waiting in line like any other customer.
At that moment, the number of aircraft or tanks will have no significance whatsoever.
And that is exactly why readiness itself is considered a geopolitical weapon.
A weapon without missiles, but based on paper, specifications, and supply chains.
And it does not necessarily have to be used against you directly.
A little delay in delivery, or a shortage in stock, or export restrictions, or delay in approving the maintenance center, or waiting for a specific component for a spare part…
At that point, you will realize you have a weapon — but it is not alert.
And a state that truly understands the economics of defense will realize that sovereignty is not achieved merely by purchase, but by the ability to operate what you buy.
This is an AI-generated English translation. The original text is in العربية
PhD Researcher in Defense Contracting and Cooperation Policies