The Cheap Deterrent Weapon

How did Iran withstand Israel despite the large gap in military capabilities? But we will explain this from an economic perspective.

Part of this discussion may have been raised earlier, but I will try to speak here from an economic angle and in an organized manner so that we ultimately arrive at a clear and interconnected idea about the deterrence method that may suit a country like Egypt.

There is an idea in defense economics that is key to understanding how medium or even economically weak countries can build an effective deterrent force without entering into a classic arms race that leads to their bankruptcy.
This idea can simply be called cheap deterrence.

The classical theory of deterrence states that in order to prevent your opponent from attacking, you must convince them of two things: that the likelihood of success for their attack is low, and that the cost of that attack (if it occurs) will be very high for them.
This approach in the past was associated with nuclear deterrence or massive conventional armies — arsenals of aircraft, armored vehicles, submarines, and so on — but most countries do not have the luxury of this model, neither financially nor technologically.

From here, the idea of asymmetric deterrence emerged, or what can also be called cheap deterrence.
Instead of trying to compete with your opponent with the same type of weapon and at the same level of spending, you look for weapon systems and tactics that make the cost of their attack on you much higher than your cost of defending yourself.
And by the way, this is not always related to technology or the type of weapon; it may relate to the style of operations or tactical planning.

Economists and strategists call this approach cost-imposing strategy, meaning a strategy aimed at raising your opponent's costs using relatively cheaper tools at your disposal.

One of the clearest real-life examples of this idea is Iran.
A country that has a very outdated conventional air arsenal compared to its neighbors and the entity, deprived for decades from importing modern Western fighter jets.
Yet, it has managed to build true deterrent capability based on a network of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones.

Iran used missile and drone programs as a relatively economical alternative to modernizing its classic air force.
In other words, it did not have the luxury of investing in both, so it chose to focus on cheap deterrence, and through this, it was able to threaten American, Israeli, and regional bases without the need for billions of dollars to purchase F-35s or Rafales.

This does not mean that its system is flawless or without weaknesses; it means that you can, with this logic, convert limited resources into an acceptable deterrent capability if you manage to calibrate the cost equation.

The same logic repeats in the A2/AD model, a concept that has emerged with China, Iran, and Russia.
Instead of these countries competing with the U.S. Navy on a “ship versus ship” basis, they build a network of anti-ship missiles, naval mines, speedboats, and drones.

The goal is not to become stronger; it is nearly impossible for any country alone, or even together, to compete with the U.S. Navy, but they have made it costly, dangerous, and uncertain for that navy to enter their spheres of influence.

This is what deterrence through cost elevation looks like:
The opponent is capable of entering, yes, but they will pay a heavy price in losses of ships, aircraft, and political reputation, and those losses are much greater than the losses the other party incurs, prompting them to reassess before taking any steps.

In the Ukrainian war, we find another model of cheap deterrence.
Ukraine has widely relied on modified commercial drones and low-cost reconnaissance and attack systems, with Western support, of course.
Integrating dual-use civil technologies into military operations has provided offensive and defensive capabilities at a much lower cost than developing traditional systems from scratch.

No medium-sized country can match Russia in artillery or missiles with the traditional Cold War mindset.
But it can create a relative deterrent balance if it uses smart and cheap technology that strikes at the weaknesses of its opponent rather than their strengths.

Economically, all these examples summarize an important concept called cost-exchange ratio, meaning: how many dollars do you need to spend to force your opponent to spend how many dollars to counter you?

So if you are producing a drone at tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars, while your opponent needs an air defense missile costing millions to intercept it, you are the winner in the economic equation even if the drone is destroyed because you are draining their resources faster than they can compensate for them.

This was one of the main reasons for the end of the war at that time; most specialists agreed — away from media propaganda — that it represented a clear victory for Iran.

The same logic is reflected today in European discussions about the "drone wall" they seek to build to confront Russian threats from missiles and drones.
Europe says: We will build a low-cost defense layer relying on interceptor drones and cheap radars instead of fully relying on expensive air defense systems like the Patriot.

And why is this important?
I want you to focus with me a little on this important point...

The importance of this thought emerges when we think about our reality as Egypt, because it changes the central question we should ask.
The question should not be: "How do we avoid the cost of purchasing expensive defense systems for deterrence?"
But rather: "How do we build a cheap deterrence strategy that fits our actual industrial and technological capabilities?"

The difference between the two questions is significant, not just in choosing between two options, but in the logic of deterrence itself.

This does not mean that we don't have fifth-generation fighters, but it means that we need to calibrate the deterrence and cost equation so that we can achieve real deterrence with our current capabilities.

Instead of spreading our limited resources across massive projects that are incomplete or strain the budget, we can build a national drone program gradually — from reconnaissance to attack — based on integrating civil and military components.
We can also develop sliding munitions and short- and medium-range cruise missiles launched from air, sea, or land that fits Egypt's geography and the nature of the surrounding threats.

Investment can also be made in electronic and cyber warfare, as well as jamming and deception methods, as their deterrent effect can sometimes surpass that of expensive conventional defense systems.

So that the idea is not misunderstood: cheap weapons are not necessarily better; the cost of creating a network of missiles, drones, and electronic warfare can also be high, but what matters is that the defensive strategy is built on a clear economic question:
How much does each dollar I spend in defense increase my deterrent capability? And how much does it drain my opponent's resources?

This is a different way of thinking than the traditional model of deterrence.
In the traditional model, calculations start from your own capabilities; "build what you can afford."
As for the deterrence we are talking about here, it starts from your opponent's capabilities: What are their capabilities? And how much can you make them lose? And what is the cost of that to you?

If we do not think this way, we will find ourselves collecting the most expensive weapon systems from around the world without having a clear deterrence philosophy.
We will not become a traditional superpower, nor will we succeed in playing the "cheap deterrence" game intelligently.

However, if we think with this philosophy, we might discover that building a national cheap deterrence program based on the technology we can produce and develop ourselves is much more important than the idea of possessing all types of weapons that belong to the "big boys’ club."