The American economist Jeffrey Sachs said weeks ago about Turkey: "This is an unprecedented development in NATO's history. No NATO member—inside the alliance—has reached this level of independence in defense industry."
He also noted: "They are no longer dependent on technology transfer from other NATO members."
Many people, even specialists, appear in the official media.. talking that Egypt shouldn't be compared to Turkey because Turkey's presence in NATO helped its defense industries..
This statement is very superficial.. and can be quickly responded to, then we can discuss the positives and negatives of NATO on Turkish defense industries.. and see whether its membership in NATO helped or hindered it..
I quickly say that this argument is a lazy and misleading one.. Egypt is classified as a major non-NATO ally.. and South Korea is not part of NATO and yet it has rapidly developed its defense industries.. And there is an article I wrote about South Korea previously.. Besides, this narrative is comforting.. It makes people feel that the problem is not with us.. the problem is external..
Let’s move on to Turkey..
The narrative that NATO is the reason applies if we lived in the fifties and sixties of the last century.. when Turkey received many Western weapons under the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.. but even this weapon was a significant weakness later on.. because at that time Turkey had national security problems with Greece regarding Cyprus.. The then President of the United States, Johnson, sent a stern letter to the Turkish Prime Minister Ismet İnönü warning him that the weapons supplied to Turkey through NATO and America could not be used without the alliance's approval.. and indeed, at that time Turkey could not enter Cyprus for a full ten years..
NATO does not grant any state sovereign technology for free; NATO simply offers four main benefits:
Standards and interoperability (which is a very important point, and the Middle East suffers from it, and I will discuss it in detail later).
Procurement channels and industrial cooperation.
Training, tactics, and operational experience.
Open markets but indirectly; that is, as a non-NATO country, you can enter those markets like anyone else, but being inside NATO makes your product standards compatible with NATO, making it easier to sell.
However, NATO does not transfer sensitive technology, nor does it limit political freedom in the use and export of weapons, even if those weapons are locally manufactured.
If NATO membership were a reason for automatic development, we would not have witnessed the American arms embargo in 1975 after the Cyprus War, when the U.S. Congress imposed a complete arms ban on Turkey, and Turkey suffered during that period from acute shortages in logistics, spare parts, and ammunition.
By the way, I previously mentioned that this was an important lesson for Turkey, as it began to realize at that time that dependence on Western suppliers posed an existential threat to it, and started to move towards developing local capabilities in the defense industries.
If NATO were the reason for Turkey’s development in defense industries, we wouldn’t have seen Turkey excluded from the F-35 fighter jet program, nor would it have faced difficulty in obtaining the S-400 system due to its NATO membership.
Here it is important to divide the development of Turkish defense industries into three simple stages for clarity:
The first period is the foundational period. The arms embargo after the Cyprus War was the real founding moment for Turkish defense industries. The Turkish military then realized that a tank without spare parts is just a lump of iron, and an aircraft without logistical support is merely an expensive piece of junk hanging in the sky.
From here the idea was born: We will not be able to continue relying on the Americans and Europeans for every screw and hydraulic hose.
In the late seventies and eighties, they began to lay the main pillars of what we see today:
The establishment of Aselsan for defense electronics as a local arm responsible for radar and communications.
Then TAI was founded as an umbrella for aerospace industries, initially under licensed partnerships with the West, but over time it developed real design and development capabilities.
Subsequently, the companies Roketsan for missiles and Havelsan for software and systems emerged.
So what we see today of major Turkish companies did not just fall from the sky in 2015 with the appearance of the TB2 aircraft, but a large part of it was born as a direct reaction to the arms embargo in the seventies, when the Turkish military tried to free itself from imposed restrictions and from having its decisions dependent on Congressional approval.
Then the eighties and nineties formed the second phase, which is the phase of "We learn from the West but within our local industry". The goal was not to boycott the West but to use it as a tool for education and acceleration, but on our land and on our terms.
How did that happen?
Turkey entered into joint production and licensing programs. The most notable example of this was the local production project of the F-16 aircraft at TAI in the late eighties. This project was not just assembly; it involved three essential things:
The presence of production lines within Turkey.
Thousands of Turkish engineers and technicians interact daily with modern aviation technology.
Accumulated experience that will later allow you to think and say: Why not make a local fighter jet?
Based on those production lines, TEI was established in partnership with General Electric to assemble and manufacture parts of aircraft engines within Turkey, a field that is extremely sensitive and not easily opened by the West.
At that time, the way of armament itself changed; instead of buying a ready-made product, you began to buy and transfer technology and then partially manufacture locally.
So NATO did not grant Turkey technology on a silver platter, but its presence as a significant ally on NATO's southern flank gave it leverage to say: I want a piece of the pie, I won't remain just a customer forever.
Here we are talking about political will, not an offering from NATO.
By the end of the nineties, Turkey was still dependent on the West in many matters, but it had gained:
Companies that operate effectively.
Engineers who gained real experience.
Effective production lines.
And a state mentality that began to understand the meaning of having a defense industrial base, not just a storage for imported weapons.
The third phase is the post-2000 period, which we can call the phase of relative self-sufficiency.
At that time, the state announced: We want to move from what we currently have towards a real defense independence project.
Since around 2004, significant decisions began to be taken, the most prominent of which were:
Cancelling ready-made import deals.
Turning a large part of them into local development projects.
Raising the banner of national technology.
Injecting significant investments in research and development instead of directing all funds to ready-made purchases.
As a result of these stages, after twenty years from the start of the third phase, Turkey now has local systems in almost all fields: armored vehicles, ships, unmanned aerial vehicles, cruise missiles, national tank projects, attack helicopters, frigates, and drone carriers.
The percentage of the army's needs met by local industry has exceeded 70%, meaning that reliance on local production has become the norm rather than the exception.
If we reflect on these stages, we will understand that NATO did not grant Turkey technology; rather, embargoes, pressures, and restrictions drove Turkey to make a decision that requires strong political will to build its defense industries locally.
In fact, Turkey is still trying today to resolve and untangle the imposed problems that hinder its defense industries, such as jet engines, tanks, and some critical electronics, and long-range air defense systems. The sanctions imposed on Turkey were far more significant than the opportunities opened to it because of its NATO membership, especially knowing that Turkey faces real problems entering the European market.
If we look at Egypt, we will find it has a substantial defense industrial base, with factories and experience extending back to 1975. There are old documents, like an article written in 1983 by the writer James Paul on the MERIP site, mentioning that the Egyptian military industry at that time was producing some light weapons and small naval vessels for the army and that Egypt was an active arms buyer.
The fundamental difference is that the issue does not concern an external party that will allow you to possess sovereign technology, but the question: Are your purchases directed at building local capabilities that are exportable?
Is there an effective research and development financing system (R&D)?
Is there transparency and real competition producing competitive quality?
Is your industry connected with small and medium enterprises through global supply chains?
And is there even an entity or institution in Egypt thinking about these issues and putting policies in place to change the current reality?
South Korea, which built one of the strongest defense industries in the world, was subject to American restrictions on missiles for many years, and these restrictions were only lifted in 2021. However, it managed to build local manufacturing capabilities, including in the components of missiles themselves, despite the American restrictions imposed on it.
Turkey, in short, did not advance because it is a NATO member but because it treated weapons as a state export industrial project. South Korea also treated this industry as a technology export industry. Turkey’s presence in NATO opened some doors for it, but at the same time, it closed other more important and sensitive doors in its face.
As for Egypt, unfortunately, we are adept at finding excuses that justify our lag in this industry, rather than seeking the causes of the lag itself and attempting to solve them.. just like the excuse of the lazy student who blames the board for his failure.
This is an AI-generated English translation. The original text is in العربية
PhD Researcher in Defense Contracting and Cooperation Policies