Until 2015, the Egyptian Air Force was almost entirely based on F-16 fighters. They are undoubtedly an important fighter, but the version sold to Egypt had significantly limited offensive capabilities due to the American restrictions imposed on armament in general, and particularly on Egypt.
The versions owned by Egypt have limited offensive capabilities (like Maverick missiles and guided bombs), but they are deprived of AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles, which means the absence of the ability to engage beyond visual range. Additionally, there are none of the JSOW missiles and a lack of deep penetration capabilities or advanced anti-radar missiles. Therefore, the F-16 became more of a defensive platform than an offensive one, for a clear and known reason: to maintain Israel's qualitative superiority in the region.
Egypt requested about 220 F-16 aircraft, with about 218 aircraft actually entering service, which are documented and announced figures. However, the combat readiness rates are not officially announced and are estimated to be between 160–180 aircraft.
Moreover, the security appendix in the peace agreement restricts combat air deployment in parts of Sinai, although there were understandings after 2011 that allowed limited air operations for the Egyptian Air Force. However, the original legal restrictions still stand.
Egypt then began taking steps towards breaking its complete dependence on the United States and diversifying its military arsenal, steps that should be supported and encouraged as they represent an important turning point. No political disagreements should make us underestimate the importance of these steps.
The first step was purchasing French Rafale fighters.
Despite all that is said about Rafale issues, there are other equally important factors, such as delivery speed and the number of fighters and accompanying munitions. This was the first fighter in the Egyptian Air Force with a complete offensive armament package, which included:
·SCALP-EG missiles for deep strikes (range of 250–500 km).
·MICA missiles for air-to-air combat.
·AASM advanced smart bombs.
·Exocet AM39 anti-ship missiles.
These are capabilities that were not available before in the Egyptian F-16 fighters.
For the first time, Egypt had a fighter capable of carrying out offensive missions without American permission or external political control over its use during crises, enhancing deterrent capability and solidifying independence in military decision-making.
The second step was purchasing Russian MiG-29 fighters, which represents an important addition as it came with a package of offensive munitions needed by Egypt, including:
·R-77 (which is the counterpart to the prohibited American AMRAAM missile).
·R-73 for close combat.
·KH-31 anti-radar and anti-ship missiles.
·KH-29 for penetration and striking ground targets.
It is true that the MiG-29 suffers from radar and maintenance issues, and that Russian support has been affected by the war, but it remains a necessary element because it gives Egypt offensive capabilities independent of American politics.
Historically, the United States has always sold arms under complex political conditions, unlike Russia. From this, one can predict that Syria will increasingly turn in the future to purchase Russian and perhaps Chinese weapons as well.
Then came the Sukhoi-35 deal, which, had it entered service officially, would have represented a tremendous qualitative leap. However, the deal was halted due to American threats from the CATSA law regarding sanctions, leading to a significant part of the manufacturing being shifted to Iran. This reinforces that dependence on American weapons or American influence is not secure or guaranteed.
As for the Mirage-2000, it still exists but in a complementary role and limited numbers (about 19 aircraft). It is freer from American restrictions, but it falls short of Rafale in many respects in capabilities and armament.
The new and important file is represented in the Turkish fighter project. So far, there is no official document from the governments, but there are industrial and intelligence reports indicating that Turkey has initially agreed to involve Egypt in the project, and that negotiations are ongoing regarding technology transfer and co-production.
If this cooperation is completed, it would represent a real strategic leap and may open the door to developing local manufacturing capabilities for a fourth++ or even fifth-generation fighter for the first time.
If we draw a timeline, we find that Egypt received the last four F-16 aircraft in 2015, and in the same year, the Rafale deal for 24 aircraft was concluded. In 2021, a contract was made for an additional 30 Rafale aircraft. Also in 2015, an agreement was reached for 46 Russian MiG aircraft, and in 2018 and 2019, a Sukhoi-35 agreement was signed that was later canceled due to American sanctions.
As for 2024, unconfirmed reports indicate a potential Egyptian agreement on the Chinese fighter J-10C and possibly also J-35.
All of this leads to an important point, which is that diversifying sources of armament is a necessary strategic step, and Egypt has taken it at the right time. It is certain that significant diplomatic efforts are behind these moves, as the file of Israeli qualitative superiority is not easy.
One of the most important reasons for this step is that total dependency on the United States, under an unstable political relationship with it, makes the Egyptian air power hostage to an external political decision.
Therefore, diversification creates an independent deterrent system; France provides deep munitions, Russia offers anti-radar capabilities, and Turkey allows for a manufacturing partnership. All of this enhances decision-making independence and national sovereignty.
However, the main problem remains in integration between the different armament systems, given the varied supply chains, ground equipment, training, maintenance, technical support systems, and combat schools. This is a significant challenge that requires precise management and engineering.
Recently, I have read that there are Egyptian technical efforts being made in this area.
This direction represents a historic step, as Egypt builds for the first time the independence of its decision on its air capabilities, smartly emerging from a corner it had been confined to.
And despite the challenges that come with diversifying armaments in the integration of systems, this diversification remains an urgent necessity, and Egypt has realized that at an appropriate time, even if it came a little late.
In my view, the current international circumstances, including political tensions and the presence of an administration like Trump's previously, along with increasing pressures on the Israeli entity, provide Egypt a historic opportunity to continue developing a defense diversification policy.
Because future global stability may mean the retreat of this opportunity and increasing external pressure on Cairo.
This is an AI-generated English translation. The original text is in العربية
PhD Researcher in Defense Contracting and Cooperation Policies